• CONSTITUTION

Davis V. Federal Election Commission

Constitutional validity of §319 of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) or Millionaire's Amendment"

Suit for a declaration that §319 of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), part of the so-called "Millionaire's Amendment is unconstitutional as it violates First Amendment rights as it is not applicable uniformally.

Sections 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment. If §319(a)'s elevated contribution limits could be applied across the board to all candidates, Appellant would have no constitutional basis for challenging them. Section 319(a), however, raises the limits only for non-self-financing candidates and only when the self-financing candidate's expenditure of personal funds causes the "opposition personal funds amount" (OPFA) threshold to be exceeded. The Court has never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates competing against each other, and it agrees with Appellant that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech.

• CRIMINAL

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER

Right to possess handgun

Suit against District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession and prohibition of registration of handguns and trigger-lock requirement.

Handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. This prohibition--in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute--would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.

• CIVIL

Exxon Shipping Company et al V. Baker et al

Object of punitive damages

Petitioners' (Exxon) supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. Ninth Circuit court upheld jury instruction on corporate liability and ultimately remitted the punitive damages award against Exxon to $2.5 billion.

Punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In the circumstances of this case, the award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory damages. Prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of "enormity," Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371, in which a defendant's conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for others' rights, or even more deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.

Giles vs California

Forfeiture of right to confront victim's testimony by wrong doing

At petitioner Giles' murder trial, the court allowed prosecutors to introduce statements that the murder victim had made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence call. Giles was convicted. Appellate Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause permitted the trial court to admit into evidence the unconfronted testimony of the murder victim under a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. It concluded that petitioner had forfeited his right to confront the victim's testimony because it found petitioner had committed the murder for which he was on trial--an intentional criminal act that made the victim unavailable to testify.

Held: The California Supreme Court's theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not an exception to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation requirement because it was not an exception established at the founding. No case before 1985 applied forfeiture to admit statements outside the context of conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying.

The manner in which this forfeiture rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of a witness, but had not done so to prevent the witness from testifying, unconfronted testimony was excluded unless it fell within the separate common-law exception to the confrontation requirement for statements made by speakers who were both on the brink of death and aware that they were dying.

• INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

ECJ on Adidas Stripes - Assessing Infringement

Trademark infringement suit brought by sportswear manufacturer, Adidas against fashion outlet H &M for allegedly using similar stripes on its clothing range as that of Adidas's famous three-stripes logo.

European Court of Justice ruled on whether the general interest in the availability of given signs in the market should have any bearing on the protection provided by a trade mark. The ECJ ruled that the requirement of availability should not play a part in assessing confusion.